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OSHA EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS: TOO
PREJUDICIAL TO BE ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
A MACTUNE'S SAFETY OR DEFECT, OR
SIMPLY ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FOR THE
FACT FINDER? *
Michael Sints, Esq. **
INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health
Act ("OSHA"). 1 Through the promulgation of safety standards
by the Secretary of Labor, the act "require[s] all employers to
take all feasible steps to avoid industrial accidents." 2 Despite its
focus on the employer's duty to safeguard the workplace, 3 OSHA
* Published with the permission of Arizona State University Law
Review.
** The author graduated from Yale College, cum laude and New York
University Law School; is a member of the New York State Bar;, is a member
of the firm of Debrot & Siris with offices in New York City and Manhasset,
New York; and is an interim appointee to the New York State Supreme Court
(subject to N.Y.S. Senate confirmation). William Joseph Graham, research
editor, Touro Law Review, assisted in the editing. D. Peter DeSimone, a
second year student at Hofstra Law School, provided research assistance.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988).
2. General Dynamics Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n., 599 F.2d 453, 464 (1st Cir. 1979). The court held that where a
shipyard worker was killed by falling material, sufficient evidence of
inadequate safety training existed to attach liability to the employer, and
rejected the employer's argument that adequacy of training should be measured
against an industry-wide standard, because "such a standard would allow an
entire industry to avoid liability." Id. The specific purposes of OSHA are
enumerated at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(1)-(13) (1988).
3. See Ries v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1160
("Like other safety statutes, OSHA is to be construed broadly in favor of
ensuring workplace safety."), reh'g denied, (3d Cir. 1992). The court stated
that "The Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted in 1970 in response
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has had an impact on products liability litigation as litigants have
used, or attempted to use, evidence of compliance or non-compli-
ance with OSHA standards to prove a machine's safety or defec-
tiveness. 4 This article discusses the admissibility of OSHA
compliance or non-compliance in federal court products liability
cases, and considers how proposed revisions to 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts5 may impact on the state of the law.
Section 653(b)(4) of OSHA contains a saving clause regarding
OSHA's applicability, providing:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any work[e.r's] compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or
4. See MeHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt Corp., 912 F.2d 394, 396-
97 (10th Cir. 1990) (defendant manufacturer allowed to introduce OSHA
evidence for the limited purpose of cross examining plaintiff's expert witness
with respect to the Occupational Safety and Health Act to show that OSHA
regulations recognized ANSI standards); Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., 770 F.2d
601, 609 (6th Cir. 1985) (defendant manufacturer commented on OSHA
regulations which placed the duty to guard against injury on the employer, and
the court held that it was reversible error to fail to give limiting instruction
regarding OSHA evidence); Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d
129, 133-34 (8th Cir. 1985) (defendant manufacturer successfully introduced
OSHA evidence to rebut plaintiff's contentions that defendant failed to warn
and to rebut plaintiff's alternative design argument); Sundbom v. Erik
Riebling Co., No. 89 Civ. 4660 (JSM), 1990 WL 128920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
August 28, 1990) (mem.) (during discovery defendant manufacturer
successfully produced a letter stating that the guard on the machine in question
complied with OSHA standards).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A
provides in pertinent part:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
240 [Vol I0
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statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees
under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of em-
ployees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
6
In ordinary negligence actions, this saving clause has been con-
strued to mean merely that in enacting OSHA, Congress did not
intend to confer upon injured employees a private right of action7
that would bypass state worker's compensation laws, which are
typically the only form of redress available to an injured em-
ployee vis-h-vis his or her employer. 8
The admissibility of OSHA standards as evidence of a ma-
chine's safety or defect is governed by Rule 403 of the Federal
6. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1988).
7. See Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 263-68 (Ist Cir.
1985). The Court of Appeals reversed a defense verdict in a Federal
Employers Liability Act ("FELA") action, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988), in part
because the trial court denied plaintiff's instruction that an OSHA violation
could support a claim of negligence per se, holding that FELA allowed the
doctrine of negligence per se to be predicated on an OSHA violation. With
respect to whether OSHA violations can constitute negligence per se so as to
preclude contributory negligence in FELA actions, the circuits are divided.
See, eg., Ries v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1162
(OSHA violation not negligence per se in FELA action), reh'g denied, (3d
Cir. 1992); Albrecht v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 808 F.2d 329, 332-33
(4th Cir. 1987) (reiterating that OSHA violation was not negligence per se in
FELA action).
8. Absent special circumstances, an employee injured on the job may
recover from her employer only those damages provided for in the applicable
worker's compensation laws. See, eg., N.Y. WORK. COhp. LAW § 11
(McKinney 1992) ("The liability of an employer... shall be exclusive and in
place of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee .... "); see also
Posey v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 93 F.2d 726, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1937)
(holding that United States Employees' Compensation Act is the only remedy
generally available to United States employees); In re Spencer Kellogg &
Sons, 52 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1931) (holding that a representative of a deceased
employee could not bring an action for wrongful death against employer as the
contractual status to compensation was the sole remedy available), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom, The Linseed King, 285 U.S. 502 (1932); Matheny v.
Edwards Ice Mach. & Supply Co., 39 F.2d 70, 73 (9th Cir.) (holding that
where an accident occured in a plant and all parties were of a single employ
worker's compensation was awarded in lieu of all other remedies), cert.
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Rules of Evidence.9 The rule weighs the probative value of the
proffered evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice which
may result from its admission.10 If the evidence is allowed, the
objectant will likely be entitled to a limiting instruction guiding
the jury as to the limited purpose for which the OSHA regulation
may be considered. 11
9. FED. R. EvID. 403. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
10. FED. R. EvID. 403. See Libby v. Griffith Design & Equip. Co., Civ.
No. 88-0282-P 1991 WL 185178 (D. Me., June 19, 1990). "Pursuant to
Federal Rule 403, Plaintiff may ... have to prove that the probative value of
the [OSHA] evidence is not outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect." Id.
at *3-*4; see also Smith v. Eaton Corp., 456 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D. Tenn.
1976), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978). The court stated:
considering arguendo that the aforementioned [OSHA] standards provide
relevant evidence on the issue mentioned, its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the plaintiff, a confusion of
the strict liability in tort issue, and the consequent misleading of the jurors,
whose principal attention might be diverted thereby from the real issue ....
Id.; Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409, 417 (5th Cir.
1987) (finding that Rule 403 determinations are "often inextricably bound with
the facts of a particular case and thus will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
showing of 'clear abuse .... '" and that "even if the district court's exclusion
of the evidence was erroneous, the error would not require reversal unless it
adversely affected the substantial rights of the complaining party."(quoting
Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 427 (5th Cir. 1985))).
11. See FED. R. EvID. 105. Rule 105 provides: "When evidence which is
admissible as to one party for one purpose but not admissible as to another
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict
the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." See also
Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1226 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding that where district court "expressly instructed the jury that the
OSHA regulation was applicable only to [the employer].. . " and not to
defendant manufacturer the district court's cautionary instructions prevented a
false issue of fact from being injected into the trial); but see Cook v. Navistar
Int'l Transp. Corp., 940 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that where court
was unable to formulate an adequate limiting instruction evidence of safety
regulation was properly excluded); see also Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d
1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932). Regarding the
effectiveness of limiting instructions, Judge Learned Hand explained:
4
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Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, 29 U.S.C. section 653(b)(4) does
not preclude the admission of an OSHA regulation into evidence
by charging the jury that the regulation may be considered as
"one more piece of evidence on the issue of negligence." 12 In-
deed, the First Circuit has gone even further, holding that an
OSHA violation could support a finding of negligence per se. 13
However, the use of evidence of compliance or non-compliance
with OSHA regulations in federal court products liability actions
[Evidence] gets before the jury, and the less they are told about the grounds
for its admission, or what they shall do with it, the more likely they are to
use it sensibly. The subject seems to gather mist which discussion serves
only to thicken, and which we can scarcely hope to dissipate by anything
further we can add.
Id; see contra 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGAREr A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN ON
EVIDENCE, 105 [01], at 105-10 (1993):
[If the point which the disputed evidence is to prove] can just as well be
proven by other evidence, or if the evidence is of but slight weight or
importance upon the point, the trial judge might well be justified in
excluding it entirely, because of its prejudicial and dangerous character as to
other points .... This would emphatically be true where there is good
reason for believing that the real objective for which the evidence is offered
is not to prove the point for which it is ostensibly offered and is competent,
but is to get before the jury declarations as to other points, to prove which
evidence is incompetent.
Id. (quoting Adkins v. Brett, 193 P. 251, 254 (Cal. 1920)).
12. Albrecht v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 808 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir.
1987) (holding that no reversible error was committed when district court read
OSHA regulations to jury as evidence on issue of negligence in a FELA
action). Other circuits have held similarly. See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942
F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1991) (OSHA standards relevant in common law
negligence actions), cet. denied, 112 S. Ct. 993 (1992); Melerine v.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc. 659 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
while OSHA regulation did not establish negligence per se against party who
was not plaintiff's employer it could be used as evidence of negligence which
could be either accepted or rejected by trier of fact); Provenza v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660, 665-66 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding that where
longshoreman was injured while loading ship trial court erred in not granting
plaintiff's request that Safety and Health Regulation for Longshoring, 29
C.F.R. § 91, be read to jury as evidence of ship owner's negligence), cart.
denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
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has not received universal approval. Perhaps this is because evi-
dence of compliance or non-compliance with an OSHA regulation
may improperly suggest to a jury that an employer's OSHA duty
to provide a safe machine precludes a manufacturer's duty to
manufacture a safe machine. 14
As will be shown, in products liability actions in federal court,
the Second, 15 Third, 16 Fifth, 17 Tenth, 18 Eleventh, 19 and D.C.
Circuits20 have allowed OSHA evidence. The First, 2 1 Fourth, 22
14. See Murphy v. L & J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1977)
(finding lower court erred in introducing OSHA regulations as doing so
created a false issue of who had the duty to guard), modified, 577 F.2d 27,
and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); but see McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638
F.2d 270, 275-76 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that OSHA standards were not
admissible in an action against a manufacturer because such standards apply
solely to employers).
15. See Cappellini v. McCabe Powers Body Co., 713 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir.
1983) (plaintiff's failure to comply with OSHA regulation admissible to show
contributory negligence); Sundbom v. Erik Riebling Co., 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11297, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that manufacturers and
distributors may introduce evidence of compliance with OSHA standards in
common law negligence actions).
16. See Tees v. Bliss, No. 82-710 (E.D. Pa., July 1, 1985) (stating that a
court may allow references to industrial safety codes, including OSHA
regulations, in products liability actions), aff'd, 786 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1986);
Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286, 292 (W.D. Pa. 1976)
(holding that jury could consider OSHA regulations in determining the liability
of a manufacturer for defective design), aff'd, 556 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
17. See Quinn v. Southwest Wood Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir.
1979) (defendant allowed to admit evidence of compliance with OSHA
standards in products liability action).
18. See McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt Corp., 912 F.2d 394, 396
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a reference to OSHA in order to enhance
credibility of another safety standard was permissible).
19. See White v. W.G.M. Safety Corp., 707 F. Supp. 544, 547 n.4 (S.D.
Ga. 1988) (stating that OSHA violations are admissible as evidence of
negligence on the part of an employer), aff'd, 891 F.2d 906 (11th Cir. 1989).
20. See McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (admitting OSHA regulations to show that manufacturer was aware
of product dangers).
21. See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1991) (OSHA
standards relevant in common law negligence actions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
993 (1992); McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1981). The
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1993], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/12
OSHA EVIDENCE
Sixth23 , and Eighth Circuits24 have both allowed and excluded
such evidence, and the Seventh25 and Ninth Circuits26 have not
directly addressed the issue. Where OSHA evidence has been al-
lowed, such evidence has been used for a variety of reasons. 27
McKinnon court explained that safety standards may be admitted to prove
negligence in product liability actions but OSHA standards are not admissible
in consumer product liability cases against manufacturer. Id. at 274-75
22. See Smiley v. Economy Forms Corp., 846 F.2d 73 (Table), 1988 WL
46283, **1 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Because OSHA standards are applicable only to
employers, they are irrelevant to the liability of defendants, the manufacturer
and lessor of the [dangerous equipment] .... "); Home v. Owens Coming
Fiberglass Corp, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2194, *10-11 (4th Cir. 1993)
(admitting OSHA regulations as state-of-the-art evidence, as well as relevant to
industry standards); Albrecht v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 808 F.2d 329 (4th
Cir. 1987) (FELA case which held that OSHA regulations provide evidence
regarding the standard of care required of employers in negligence actions).
23. See Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., 770 F.2d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that OSHA standards could not be used by defendant-manufacturer to
prove that employer had duty to guard unless limiting instruction was given);
Minichello v. United States Indus., Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985). The
court explained that evidence may not be admitted to show that a product does
not violate OSHA standards because the Occupational Safety & Health Act
states that it is not intended to have an effect on the civil standard of liability,
and is applicable only to employers but court cautioned that OSHA may be
relevant in other instances to product liability cases. Id. at 29.
24. See Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129, 133-34 (8th
Cir. 1985) (defendant introduced OSHA regulation to rebut plaintiff's failure
to warn claim); Murphy v. L & J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1977)
(admission of OSHA evidence offered by manufacturer constituted reversible
error as it created false issue of who had duty to guard), modified, 577 F.2d
27, and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
25. See Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff introduced evidence of OSHA regulations concerning asbestos-related
lung cancer); Elberg v. Mobil Oil Corp., 967 F.2d 1146, 1151 (7th Cir. 1992)
(while finding for defendant in longshoreman's admiralty action against vessel
owner trial court properly considered OSHA regulation requiring employer to
guard hatches).
26. See Cooper v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1106-07
(9th Cir. 1991) (exclusion of OSHA regulations offered by manufacturer to
prove that employee was contributorily negligent was harmless as jury had
already reached that same conclusion based upon other evidence).
27. See, e.g., McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Pennwalt Corp., 912 F.2d 394,
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EXCLUSION OF OSHA EVIDENCE IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY ACTIONS
Although the limitation in 29 U.S.C. section 653(b)(4) was not
discussed, one of the earlier cases excluding OSHA evidence in a
products liability action was Murphy v. L & J Press Corp.28
There, the plaintiff was injured on the defendant's punch press,
which he claimed was defectively designed because the press
lacked a guard at the point of operation. 29 At trial, which ended
in a defendant's verdict, the manufacturer introduced an OSHA
regulation and a similar American National Standards Institute
("ANSI") regulation, both indicating that the employer had a
duty to guard the point of operation. 30 On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that the OSHA and ANSI regulations were
prejudicial to the plaintiff because they injected a false issue into
the case of who had the duty to guard (the employer or manufac-
turer), as opposed to whether the manufacturer could have
guarded the point of operation. 31 Stated another way, just be-
further the credibility of another safety standard); White v. W.G.M. Safety
Corp., 707 F. Supp. 544, 547-48 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 906 (11th
Cir. 1989) (reiterating that OSHA evidence may be admitted as evidence of
employer's negligence); Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286,
292-93 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (allowing evidence of OSHA standards in considering
whether product design was unreasonably dangerous), aff'd, 556 F.2d 564 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
28. 558 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1977), modified, 577 F.2d 27, and cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
29. Murphy, 558 F.2d at 408.
30. Id. at 409.
31. Id. at 412. The Eighth Circuit ruled:
Counsel [for defendant] first led the jury down a blind alley by stating the
ANSI and OSHA materials were "[his] evidence of... who has the duty to
guard." This injected a false issue of fact into the proceedings, i.e., who
should guard as opposed to coul... [the defendant] guard .... The
United States District Court has nothing to do with OSHA enforcement
proceedings - they come to the United States Court of Appeals for review
from the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. What we do
8
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cause the employer had a duty to guard the point of operation
does not imply that the manufacturer would not have a similar
duty.
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result, excluding evidence
of OSHA compliance to establish a product's safety in Minichello
v. United States Industries, Inc.32 This result was reached even
though the manufacturer in this case merely attempted to show
that the machine was within OSHA regulations, not that the bur-
den of guarding would be shifted to the employer.33 In
Minichello, plaintiff, a die worker at a Ford Motor Company
plant, was required to stand on a spotting press, which had no
guardrail but stood approximately thirty-two inches above the
plant floor.34 After plaintiff fell and sustained various injuries, he
brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of the
unguarded platform. 35 At trial, plaintiff's safety engineer testified
regarding the alleged dangerousness of a platform without a
guardrail. 36 Defendant then cross-examined the engineer about
the platform's compliance with OSHA regulations, which re-
quired employers to guard only platforms of 4 feet or higher
above the floor.37 After the jury returned a defendant's verdict,
find is that the introduction of the ANSI code and OSHA regulations so
seriously altered the course of the trial that the central issue of "feasibility"
was lost and the improper issue of "who had the duty to guard" was tried.
Id. (citations omitted).
32. 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985).
33. Id. at 29.
34. Id. at 28.
35. Id. Plaintiffs actually sued U.S. Industries, Inc. which was the
successor in interest to the manufacturer, CMC Clearing, and at trial withdrew
claims of negligence and breach of express warranty, and proceeded only
under theories of strict liability and breach of implied warranty. Id. at 28.
Interestingly, the Minichello court did not completely close the door on use of
OSHA evidence: "We do not mean to suggest that OSHA regulations can
never be relevant in a product liability case, but OSHA regulations can never
provide a basis for liability because Congress has specified that they should
not." Id. at 29.
36. Id.
37. ld. at 28-29. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) (1992), which provides,
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plaintiff appealed on various grounds, including the manufac-
turer's introduction of the machine's OSHA compliance on cross-
examination to establish that the lack of a guardrail was not an
unreasonable defect.38 Of course, it is entirely possible that,
while an employer may not have a duty to guard a particular
feature, such as a platform under 4 feet, a manufacturer is not
necessarily relieved of the responsibility to protect against that
particular danger. 39
On appeal, the manufacturer argued that the OSHA regulation
was introduced on cross-examination for the "limited purpose" of
testing and comparing the engineer's opinion on the machine's
dangerousness without a guardrail with the content of an OSHA
(and an ANSI) regulation which, stated that the platform need not
be guarded. 40 However, as the jury was not told of the "limited
purpose" of the OSHA evidence, consideration of such evidence
was unrestricted and thus prejudicial enough to wrongly tip the
balance in defendant's favor.41
Reversing and remanding for a new trial, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit focused on the saving
clause in 29 U.S.C. section 653(b)(4), reasoning that:
If knowledge of the [OSHA] regulations leads the trier of fact to
find a product [not] defective, the effect is to impermissibly alter
the civil standard of liability.. .. We do not mean to suggest
that OSHA regulations can never be relevant in a product liabil-
ity case, but OSHA regulations can never provide a basis for li-
ability because Congress has specified [in 29 U.S.C. sec-
tion 653(b)(4)] that they should not.42
The Sixth Circuit reasserted its antipathy to using OSHA evi-
dence to prove a product's safety in Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co.43
In Bailey, an employee was injured on a punch press, which
floor ... shall be guarded by a standard railing.., on all sides except where
there is [an] entrance . . . . " Id.
38. Minichello, 756 F.2d at 28-29.
39. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
40. Minichello, 756 F.2d at 29.
41. Id. at 29-30.
42. Id. at 29.
43. 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985).
248 [Vol 10
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plaintiff claimed was defective because the press did not have a
guard at the point of operation, where his fingers were severed. 44
The manufacturer, over plaintiff's objection, made references
during its opening statement and in its direct case to OSHA
regulations which placed the burden of guarding the point of op-
eration on the employer, similar to the defendant's strategy in
Murphy.45 While the manufacturer's initial use of the OSHA
regulations may have been relevant to plaintiffs negligence
claim, the jury decided the strict liability claim. 46 In reversing,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that because the jury did not receive a
limiting instruction on the use of OSHA evidence in products li-
ability cases, "the jury was free to consider the testimony
[regarding the OSHA and ANSI regulations which placed re-
sponsibility for guarding upon the employer] as demonstrating the
non-defectiveness of the product, as proscribed in Minichello."47
Manufacturers do not necessarily want OSHA evidence intro-
duced to prove a machine's safety; manufacturers may want to
exclude OSHA regulations offered by the plaintiff to prove a ma-
chine's defectiveness. In McKinnon v. Skil Corp.,48 for example,
a consumer argued, among other things, that the lower blade
guard on a portable electric saw failed to properly return and
cover the blade, thereby injuring his foot when he placed the saw
on the floor.49 After a defendant's verdict, plaintiff appealed the
trial court's exclusion of an OSHA regulation that required saws
to have properly functioning lower blade guards. 50 Noting that
the employment (covered by OSHA) and the consumer (not cov-
ered by OSHA) contexts "are not that fungible," 51 the Court of
44. Id. at 602-03.
45. Id. at 603. In Murphy, the defendant-manufacturer attempted to
introduce OSHA evidence indicating that the employer had the duty to guard
the point of operation. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
46. 770 F.2d at 608-09.
47. Id. at 609.
48. 638 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1981).
49. ld. at 272.
50. See id. at 274 n.5. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.243 provides, in pertinent part:
"When the tool is withdrawn from the work, the lower guard shall
automatically and instantly return to covering position." Id.
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Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the exclusion of the OSHA
regulation because "OSHA regulations cannot automatically be
used as evidence of industry practice or of the standard of care to
be exercised by a reasonable person in a consumer product liabil-
ity case." 52 As the court stated, OSHA "may impose a standard
of conduct upon employers greater than that which would be
considered reasonable in the [portable saw] industry. " 53 How-
ever, the court noted that this opinion must be read narrowly to
exclude OSHA evidence to establish the manufacturer's standard
of care, only in products liability cases concerning a product de-
signed for consumer, not industrial use.54
OSHA EVIDENCE ALLOWED
Other circuit courts, and district courts within them, have
permitted OSHA evidence in products liability actions. 55 In
Sundbom v. Erik Riebling Co. ,56 the plaintiff claimed that he was
injured by a defective industrial "shaper." The defendant-manu-
facturer, during discovery, produced a letter from the New York
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 275-76 n.8. The court expressed no opinion on whether OSHA
evidence would be admissible in a products liability action against a
manufacturer of a machine designed for industrial use. See also Hagans v.
Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978). In Hagans, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's finding that a table saw with a removable blade
guard had an unreasonably dangerous design defect, allowing defendant to
introduce evidence of industry and national safety standards in the process.
The court noted that "[a] product is unreasonably dangerous if its utility does
not outweigh the magnitude of the danger inhering in its introduction into
commerce." Id. at 99. The court found that the table saw exceeded industry
safety standards and practices, and noted that the guard had to be removed to
complete many common tasks, such as cutting a sheet of 4' x 8' plywood. Id.
at 100.
55. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
56. No. 89 Civ. 4660 (JSM), 1990 WL 128920 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
1990) (mem.). In Sundbom, the author of this article served as co-counsel to
plaintiff, along with Kenneth Warner and Paul Hanly of New York City.
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State Department of Labor ("DOL") 57 stating that the guard on
the shaper in question complied with OSHA regulations. 58 An-
ticipating that the defendant-manufacturer would attempt to use
the letter at trial to prove the machine's safety, plaintiff sought an
in limine ruling to exclude the letter, citing Minichello and other
cases. 59 The district court declined to follow Minichello, and al-
lowed the manufacturer to introduce the DOL letter as evidence
of the machine's compliance with OSHA standards. 60 In rejecting
Minichello, and allowing the OSHA evidence, the Sundbom court
adopted the "majority position on this issue"61 and cited as con-
trolling the Second Circuit's decision in Cappellini v. McCabe
Powers Body Co.62 In Cappellini, the plaintiff was injured when
he fell from an allegedly defective hydraulic bucket. 63 The de-
fendant-manufacturer argued, and the Second Circuit agreed, that
plaintiff's failure to follow OSHA regulations, which required
that he be attached to the lift with a "body belt," 64 was "'some
evidence'" 65 of negligence for the jury, which, under the then
applicable doctrine of contributory negligence, could have com-
pletely barred recovery. 66 In Sundbom, Judge Martin concluded
57. The letter was written pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1908.1 (1992), which
requires that OSHA "utilize State personnel to provide consultative services to
employers" to insure "places of employment which are safe and healthful." 29
C.F.R. § 1908.1(a).
58. Sundbom v. Erik Riebling Co., No. 89 Civ. 4660 (JSM), 1990 WL
128920, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990) (mem.).
59. Id.
60. Id. at *1-*2. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
because, according to a questionnaire completed by the jury, one of the alleged
defects (inadequate operator's manual) was not covered by the DOL's
reference to OSHA compliance.
61. Id. at *1.
62. 713 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
63. ld. at 2-3.
64. ld. at4.
65. Id. at 5 (quoting Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N.Y. 346, 351, 150 N.E.
139, 140 (1925) (holding that violation of a rule promulgated by state agency
which did not have force of law failed to establish negligence per se)).
66. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1976). New York
adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence in 1975. The manufacturer in
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that "the fact that the regulations were used in ... [Cappellini by
the manufacturer to prove the plaintiffs contributory negligence]
in the context of an alleged violation, rather than in the context of
alleged compliance, is a distinction without a difference."
67
Other circuits have reached similar results, permitting OSHA
evidence in products liability actions in an even more definitive
manner than in Cappellini, where the manufacturer offered the
OSHA evidence to prove the plaintiffs contributory negli-
gence. 68 In the Fifth Circuit case of Hagans v. Oliver Machinery
Co.,69 the plaintiff obtained a jury verdict in a products liability
action against the manufacturer of an industrial saw, whose guard
the plaintiff had removed, arguing that the manufacturer should
have designed the guard "as an unremovable safety feature. "70 In
reversing, the Fifth Circuit found no evidence to support the
jury's verdict, and without discussing any cases either excluding
or including OSHA evidence, noted that "defendant's
saw... was shown [by the manufacturer] to comport with cur-
rent OSHA safety standards."71
negligence per se, which should have barred recovery. Id. at 5. The Second
Circuit, as noted, held that the OSHA violation was only "some evidence" of
negligence for the jury to take into consideration. Id. Interestingly, the Ninth
Circuit encountered the same issue in Cooper v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
945 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1991) in which a manufacturer appealed a
lower court's exclusion of an OSHA regulation which the manufacturer had
intended to use to establish a product user's contributory negligence. However,
citing Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 269 (lst Cir. 1985),
the Cooper court ruled that the error, if any, was harmless because the jury
had before it other evidence of plaintiff's negligence. Cooper, 945 F.2d at
1106-07.
67. Sundbom v. Erik Riebling Co., No. 89 Civ. 4660 (JSM), 1990 WL
128920, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990) (mem.).
68. Cappellini, 713 F.2d at 4-5.
69. 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978).
70. Id. at 100.
71. Id. at 103. William S. Sessions, former head of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, served as the trial court judge. While the Fifth Circuit allows
OSHA evidence, a manufacturer's compliance with an OSHA regulation(s)
does not necessarily exonerate the manufacturer in a products liability case.
See Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1140 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied sub. noin., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Porter, 454 U.S. 1109
(1981), in which the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the principle that a
14
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Similarly, in Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 72 the Fifth
Circuit, at a minimum, tolerated plaintiffs use of OSHA evi-
dence to prove the defectiveness of a crawler tractor cab. 7 3 At
trial, the plaintiff argued that the OSHA standard required the cab
to be completely enclosed, contrary to the design of defendant's
cab. 74 After the trial court set aside the jury's verdict, plaintiff,
among others, appealed. 75 The Fifth Circuit concluded that, even
though OSHA evidence should only be used to provide the stan-
dard of care exacted of employers, any error was harmless be-
cause a similar ANSI standard was admissible.76 In other words,
the improper admission of evidence that is merely cumulative is a
harmless error.77 Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit did not even
mention Minichello, which reached the diametrically opposite re-
sult.78
In McHargue v. Stokes Division of Pennwalt Corp.,79 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a manufacturer's intro-
duction of OSHA evidence for the limited purpose of cross-exam-
ining plaintiffs expert witness. 80 The plaintiff was injured on a
plastic molding machine which, according to the defendant-
manufacturer, complied with ANSI standards. 81 To counteract
this evidence, the plaintiff, through his expert, characterized the
manufacturer's compliance with a government standard (a respirator
conforming to standards of, among others, the Bureau of Mines) is not
necessarily enough to protect a manufacturer in a design defect case if plaintiff
produces overwhelming evidence of such defect. Id. at 1140-41 (citing Quinn
v. Southwest Wood Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1979) (jury found
ladder unreasonably defective despite evidence of compliance with OSHA and
industry standards).
72. 754 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 580.
74. Id at 581.
75. Id. at 579.
76. Id. at 582.
77. See id. at 581-82.
78. Dixon was decided on March 7, 1985, and Minichello was decided on
February 27, 1985, perhaps explaining the lack of any reference in Minichello
to Dixon.
79. 912 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1990).
80. McHargue, 912 F.2d at 396-97.
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ANSI standards as "nothing more than a minimum consensus
standard." 82 The manufacturer then attempted to refute the ex-
pert's testimony by asking whether or not OSHA recognized any
national consensus standards other than ANSI. 83 After a defen-
dant's verdict, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the cross-examina-
tion violated the proscription of 29 U.S.C. section 653(b)(4), as
articulated in Minichello.84 In affirming, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the defendant-manufacturer did not introduce a specific OS-
HA regulation to prove the product's safety. Rather, the manu-
facturer properly used the OSHA evidence on cross-examination
to re-establish the credibility of the ANSI standards, which
plaintiff had attacked. 85
The Fourth Circuit similarly approved the use of OSHA evi-
dence. In Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 86 the defendant, in accor-
dance with the customer's specifications, manufactured a crane
without a warning device to indicate that the crane was in mo-
tion. 87 Without discussing any of the anti-OSHA evidence case
law, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal be-
cause the crane had been manufactured in accordance with the
customer's reasonable specifications, and because the parties con-
ceded that OSHA did not require a warning device under such
circumstances. 88
Even if a court were to conclude that evidence of OSHA
compliance or non-compliance was not relevant to a design defect
claim against a manufacturer, OSHA evidence may be admitted
for other purposes, such as to show the negligence of another
party or non-party, provided that a limiting instruction is given. 89
82. Id. at 396.
83. Id. at 396-97.
84. Id. at 396-97. See Minichello, 756 F.2d at 29 (stating that OSHA
regulations are not admissible in evaluating whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous because the act specifically states that it is not to affect civil
liability).
85. See McHargue, 912 F.2d at 396-97.
86. 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
87. Id. at 374.
88. Id. at 375.
89. See supra note 11.
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For example, in Johnson v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 90
the plaintiff was injured on the defendant-manufacturer's punch
press, which did not have a guard at the point of operation. 91
After a defense verdict on the design defect claim, plaintiff ap-
pealed the admission of an OSHA regulation that directed em-
ployers, not manufacturers, to provide point of operation guards
on punch presses. 92 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the
district court properly instructed the jury that the OSHA regula-
tion "was applicable only to [the employer] and not applicable to
[the manufacturer]." 93
Although at first blush, Johnson appears to conflict with the
Eighth Circuit's earlier conclusion in Murphy,94 the court distin-
guished the cases. 95 The court noted that the trial judge's cau-
tionary instruction in Johnson prevented a "false issue" from be-
ing injected into the case by advising the jury that the OSHA
regulation could only be considered on the issue of the non-party
employer's negligence. 9
6
Finally, in McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc.,97 a
window washer sued a manufacturer of "U-Clips" used to secure
wire cables on the scaffolding from which he fell. 98 At trial,
plaintiff presented evidence that the backward application of such
clips diminished their holding power, and that the manufacturer
failed to warn of the danger of such backward application. 99 Al-
though the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, the trial judge
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the manufac-
90. 666 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1981).
91. Id. at 1224-25.
92. Id. at 1225-26.
93. ld. at 1226. The jury accordingly found the non-party employer 100%
responsible. Id. at 1225.
94. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
95. Johnson, 666 F.2d at 1226.
96. Ld. at 1226. No such limiting instruction was given in Murphy,
apparently because there was no issue of negligence of plaintiff's non-party
employer. See Murphy, 558 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1977), mdijfied, 577
F.2d 27, and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
97. 836 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 638.
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turer. 1O On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that
an ANSI standard, as incorporated by a later OSHA regulation,
actually prohibits the use of such clips. 101 The court reversed and
remanded, 102 concluding that, "[g]iven the foregoing, [including
the OSHA regulation], a reasonable juror could have concluded
that Crosby [the manufacturer of the clip] was fully aware of the
danger presented by the backward application of U-Clips."103
Although in the context of a failure to warn theory, the District
of Columbia Circuit clearly had no problem in applying to a
manufacturer an OSHA regulation applicable only to employers.
THE EFFECT OF PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SECTION
402A ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OSHA EVIDENCE
While some would argue that OSHA regulations are too preju-
dicial to be admissible in an action against a manufacturer, pro-
posed revisions to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts may greatly increase the probative value of evidence of
compliance or non-compliance with OSHA regulations. 104 As has
100. Id. at 638.
101. Id. at 642.
102. Id. at 647.
103. Id. at 642.
104. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A
Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1514 (1992). The authors suggested the following
revisions:
402A. Special Liability of One Who Sells a Defective Product
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition is subject to
liability for harm to persons or property proximately caused by the
product defect if the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies in the case of a claim based
on a
(a) manufacturing defect even though the seller exercised all
possible care in the preparation and marketing of the product;
or
(b) design defect only if the foreseeable risks of harm presented by
the product, when and as marketed, could have been reduced
256 [Vol 10
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been shown, some courts have allowed evidence of compliance or
non-compliance with OSHA regulations to show that a product is
"unreasonably dangerous." 10 5 In other instances, the regulations
have been admitted for a limited purpose, such as to shift re-
sponsibility to a non-party employer, 106 or to bolster the credi-
bility of other evidence. 107 Proposed changes to section 402A, if
enacted by the American Law Institute, may allow manufacturers
to raise OSHA evidence as an affirmative defense in products li-
ability actions which contain warning defect claims. 108 Similarly,
plaintiffs may have a greater chance of getting OSHA evidence in
under the proposed formulation dealing with design defects. 109
The proposed revision distinguishes between design defects and
warning defects. The section applicable to design defects contains
at reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of a safer design;
or
(c) warning defect only if the seller failed to provide reasonable
instructions or warnings about nonobvious product-related
dangers that were known, or should have been known, to the
seller.
Id.
105. See, e.g., Bun v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286, 292-93
(W.D. Pa. 1976) (allowing the jury to consider OSHA regulations in a case
against a manufacturer for design defect), aff'd, 556 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
106. See Murphy, supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text; Bailey, supra
notes 43-47 and accompanying text; Johnson, supra notes 90-96 and
accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., McHargue v. Stokes Div. of Peanwalt Corp., 912 F.2d 394,
396-97 (10th Cir. 1990) (allowing OSHA standards to be admitted in order to
enhance the credibility of an ANSI standard).
108. Perhaps evidence of compliance with OSHA could be introduced to
demonstrate that the seller did not know and should not have known about
product-related dangers that were nonobvious to the consumer. If OSHA
regulations did not require warnings, it could be argued that the seller should
have been no more aware of the danger than the consumer. See Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 104, at 1514 (proposing revisions to § 402A regarding
warnings).
109. Liability can only be attached when it is demonstrated that the
defendant could have utilized a "safer, cost-effective design" that would have
prevented the plaintiff's harm. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 104, at
1520. Consequently, OSHA standards may be admissible to demonstrate that
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a risk-utility balancing provision, stating that manufacturers will
be liable for foreseeable risks of harm only if a safer product
could have been made "at a reasonable cost by the seller's adop-
tion of a safer design."11o OSHA evidence, while not applicable
to manufacturers, would likely have a higher probative value un-
der this formulation.111 Plaintiffs could claim that a safer design
could be adopted by the manufacturer at a reasonable cost, if an
OSHA regulation required employers to guard against the harm
by providing a point of operation guard, or similar device. How-
ever, the manufacturer could argue just as easily that OSHA
regulations "impose a standard of conduct upon employers
greater than that which would be considered reasonable in the in-
dustry." 112 On the other hand, forcing the manufacturer to guard
against the harm may reduce the cost of the machine to the em-
ployer in the long run.
As for failure to warn claims, the proposed revision requires
that the dangers which the manufacturer did not warn against be
"nonobvious" risks, "that were known, or should have been
known to the seller." 113 Evidence of OSHA regulations concern-
ing the alleged failure to warn would cut deeply into a plaintiff's
claim that a particular danger was nonobvious. Similarly, plain-
tiffs could rebut a manufacturer's contention that a particular
danger was unknown by introducing an OSHA regulation that re-
quired guarding against the danger in question. A more difficult
question concerns whether a manufacturer could raise the absence
of any regulation pertaining to the danger to show that it should
not have known of a particular risk of harm. At any rate, an ar-
110. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 104, at 1514.
111. OSHA evidence could be used to demonstrate that a safer alternative is
available at a reasonable cost. This can be done with limiting instructions. Cf.
Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1226 (8th Cir.
1981) (employing limiting instructions in introducing OSHA standards to
prevent false issues from being injected into the trial) and in accordance with
FED. R. EVID. 105, see supra note 11.
112. McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 275 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating
that OSHA standards could not "automatically" be employed to demonstrate
reasonable standards).
113. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 104, at 1517 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2)(c)).
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gument aimed at excluding the OSHA evidence on the basis that
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice loses force, because the probative value has been
greatly increased. 114
Certainly, the argument that admission of OSHA evidence cre-
ates an inference that the burden of guarding against the danger
properly lies with the employer still addresses valid concerns. 115
The presumption of admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence
403,116 however, would weigh in favor of increased acceptance
of OSHA evidence due to the obvious increase in the probative
value of such evidence under the proposed formulation.
Therefore, it is likely that OSHA regulations, and other parallel
provisions, will be used increasingly to prove that safer designs
exist at a reasonable cost, and conversely, that dangers were ob-
vious, or "knowable" to manufacturers in warning defect
cases. 117
CONCLUSION
Clearly in a products liability case in federal court, the circuits
are anything but unanimous regarding the admissibility of OSHA
evidence. In Minichello and Bailey, the Sixth Circuit held that a
manufacturer's attempt to prove a machine's safety through use
of OSHA evidence was sufficiently improper to justify a new
trial, 118 and in McKinnon, the First Circuit approved the exclu-
114. Contra Murphy v. L & J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir.
1977), modified, 577 F.2d 27, and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978)
(finding that OSHA regulations were more prejudicial than probative).
115. Contra Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223,
1226 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that OSHA regulations were properly introduced
because they were relevant to the employer's negligence despite the fact that
the manufacturer, not the employer, was the defendant).
116. FED. R. EvID. 403. See supra note 9.
117. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 104, at 1514 (proposed provisions
to § 402A (2)(b) and (2)(c) refer respectively to such design defect and
warning defect theories).
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sion of a manufacturer's proffered OSHA evidence. 119 Con-
versely, OSHA evidence was allowed by the Second Circuit in
Cappellini, the Fourth in Spangler, the Fifth in Hagans and
Dixon, the Tenth in McHargue and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in McNeal. In Cappellini and McHargue, however, the OS-
HA evidence was allowed for the limited purposes of proving a
plaintiff's contributory negligence, and cross-examination of an
expert witness, respectively. 120 Finally, the Eight Circuit, in
Johnson and Murphy, respectively, has both allowed OSHA evi-
dence for a limited purpose 12 1 and excluded it when such evi-
dence could have unfairly misled the jury regarding a product's
defect. 122
The absolute exclusion adopted in such cases as Minichello may
not be justified despite the saving clause in section 653 (b)(4).
After all, in that clause, Congress was merely manifesting its in-
tent that OSHA does not afford an injured worker a private right
of action against his or her employer, thereby circumventing state
worker's compensation laws which were designed as the exclu-
sive remedy for such injured workers. 123 It is difficult to imagine
that Congress inserted that clause in anticipation of attempts by
litigants to prove through the use of evidence of OSHA compli-
ance or non-compliance a machine's safety, or lack thereof.
Surely, with proper cautionary instructions, it should not be diffi-
cult for a jury in a products liability action to comprehend that an
OSHA regulation is not binding on a manufacturer, and a ma-
chine's compliance or non-compliance with an OSHA regulation
is merely one factor for it to consider in assessing whether a ma-
chine is defective or not.
In any event, a products liability practitioner, whether repre-
senting a plaintiff or defendant, should be prepared to provide the
trial court with relevant case law on the admissibility of OSHA-
related evidence. If the trial court does not adopt the absolute
approach in Minichello and allows the OSHA evidence, the
119. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 62-66 & 79-85 and accompanying text.
121. See Johnson, 666 F.2d at 1226.
122. See Murphy, 558 F.2d at 412.
123. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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objectant is entitled to a limiting instruction, as was, for example,
approved in Johnson, or Bunn, so that the jury is aware that evi-
dence of OSHA compliance or non-compliance applies only to
employers, that a manufacturer need not necessarily comply with
OSHA, and that if it does (or does not) that is only a factor for
the jury in assessing a product's safety. Notwithstanding the
prohibition in Minichello and other cases, the question of whether
OSHA evidence is admissible in a products liability context, or
any other context, is an evidentiary one. Therefore, the mere fact
that OSHA applies to employers should not imply that, with ap-
propriate instructions, OSHA-related evidence may never be rele-
vant on the issue of the safety of a given product.
23
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